

The Concept of Destiny in Depth Psychology and Theology

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The Problem of Destiny

In his inaugural lecture at the University of Frankfurt in 1929 Paul Tillich reopened the problem of destiny for modern theology. He argued that destiny consists of a transcendent necessity in which freedom becomes entangled (Tillich 1961: 23–24). Tillich’s intent was to show that freedom is finite and that it occupies a limiting context of meaning and necessity. If freedom were absolute, it would be unconditional and without a destiny.

Twenty-two years later Tillich returned to the same issue. In the first volume of his *Systematic Theology* he contended that freedom and destiny constitute a basic polarity in the structure of being. He defined freedom as the “deliberation, decision, and responsibility” of a centered self (Tillich 1951: 184). Free actions take place within a milieu of bodily structures, mental tendencies, the remembered and unremembered past, and previous choices. These comprise a destiny that “is not a strange power which determines what shall happen to me. It is myself as given, formed by nature, history, and myself. My destiny is the basis of my freedom; my freedom participates in shaping my destiny” (Tillich 1951: 185).

While the polarity of freedom and destiny is fundamental, its terms may come into conflict. This occurs in the realm of existence which culminates in death. When facing death as a final horizon, we are threatened with the anxiety of having to die. The confrontation with death may be called fate. The essential polarity of freedom and destiny disintegrates into that of necessity and arbitrariness which are forms of fate, respectively. In this situation the self becomes split, loses its centeredness, and cannot make free decisions.

In *The Courage To Be* Tillich clarified further the relation between fate and destiny. Death would be the absolute threat of nonbeing, while fate would be its relative manifestation. “The term ‘fate’...stresses an element which is common to all of them: their contingent character, their unpredictability, the impossibility of showing their meaning and purpose” (Tillich 1952: 43). Tillich maintained this view until his death in 1965. Although some of his students would carry on his ideas, the question of destiny became somewhat neglected in contemporary theology.

The aim of this essay is to take up the problem of destiny as originally proposed by Tillich and to reconstruct it as a theory. I choose depth psychology as my principal resource, because it has provided practical concepts to understand the interplay of freedom and destiny. When Tillich was at work, he advocated the use of depth psychology, particularly psychoanalysis, as a dialogue partner with theology. He was apparently not acquainted, however, with a specific school of depth psychology, devoted exclusively to the problem of destiny, namely *Schicksal* analysis of Leopold Szondi, which I discuss below.

Sigmund Freud's Concept of Destiny

The modern psychological investigation of destiny was begun by Sigmund Freud in 1915. In his essay entitled "Instincts and their Vicissitudes" he set forth an approach that would shape his so-called psychic determinism. The idea of destiny is implicated in the essay in the sense that the title is an English translation of the German term for "drive destinies" (*Triebchicksale*). Freud's crucial insight was that destiny is governed by instinctual drives as opposed to instincts, as such. The drives are forces, arising from within the bodily organism, that create needs which must be satisfied (Freud 1959: 62). Drives are inner motives which function regardless of any external actions. Each drive has an impulse, aim, object, and source.

At this stage of his reflection Freud identified two instinctual drives. One is the ego or that of self-preservation, and the other is sexuality. These two drives can come into conflict and, consequently, unfold in patterns of neurotic activity (Freud 1959: 67). The earlier the conflict the more compulsive is the consequent behavior. The outcome consists of four specific possibilities or destinies. (1) Sexuality can undergo a turn-around and shift from love to hate. (2) Sexuality can turn against the self when, for example, sadism becomes masochism. (3) The sexual drive may be repressed in order to exclude pain from consciousness. (4) The drive may also be sublimated.

These four patterns indicate that Freud's theory of destiny has a defensive function. Destiny as a form of behavior occurs because the ego defends itself against the sexual drive. Such instinctual drive tension develops in early childhood. One common source takes place when the infantile ego, in its search for oral pleasure, is confronted with unpleasant associations. In defense against the unpleasantness the infantile ego asserts itself through hatred. During the first year of life, the hatred is fused with sexuality. When the first Oedipal phase arrives, between ages three and five, the hatred separates from the sexuality. This split turns into a love-hate

ambivalence that is expressed toward the child's parents. The boy loves the mother and hates the father. The girl loves the father and hates the mother. These Oedipal patterns consummate the destiny of infantile sexuality.

Five years later Freud modified his theory. He conceived of sexuality more broadly as *eros* or the life drive. The life drive combines substances into larger relationships so as to facilitate the growth of the organism and to protect it from external dangers. He also posited *thanatos* or the death drive. This is a silent, inner tendency of the organism to return to a pre-organic stratum of nature (Freud 1955: 38). In ordinary experience the life and death drives coalesce into a whole. Consequently, *thanatos* is neutralized by *eros*. The ego cooperates with *eros*, so that the person can work and love and maintain good mental health.

The 1920 theory posited a duality of the drives independent of the ego. The forces of *eros* and *thanatos* express the fundamental attraction and repulsion in the universe. *Eros* represents attraction, *thanatos* repulsion. Even though these two drives fuse in ordinary experience, they can also separate. Freud conceded this possibility in two places. In "The Ego and the Id" he writes: "Once we have admitted the idea of a fusion of the two classes of instincts with each other, the possibility of a more or less complete—'defusion' of them forces itself upon us" (Freud 1961a: 41). Elsewhere he stated that with regard "to a fusion of instincts of this kind, there may as a result of certain influences be a *defusion* of them" (Freud 1961: 164). An epileptic seizure would be an example of instinctual defusion.

While making this point, Freud concedes that he does not understand how the defusion takes place. He offers, however, two illustrations that bear upon his 1915 theory. When *eros* and *thanatos* disintegrate, the latter breaks out from the bond in the form of sexual aggression. This is an instance of sadism, one of the four drive destinies cited above. The other involves sublimation. When *thanatos* is transferred to a lofty level, the ego loses the power to neutralize the death drive. As a result, the death drive is released as a destructive aggression through the super-ego. This is Freud's explanation of the fact that religious ideas have a cruel, judgmental aspect. To the extent that sublimation exhibits a religious destiny, then it is driven by considerable aggression.

When Freud discusses sublimation as a destiny, he achieves a significant insight. "The super-ego fulfills the same function of protecting and saving that was fulfilled in earlier days by the father and later by Providence and Destiny" (Freud 1961a: 58). In Freud's system the super-ego

comprises conscience and the ego ideal. Conscience expresses what one ought not to do, and it is balanced by the ego-ideal which represents what one ought to do. As a composite whole, the super-ego results from introjecting the father as a model. This introjection usually occurs at the end of the Oedipal phase by about age five or six.

The effect of Freud's insight is to demythologize the traditional idea of destiny. For Freud destiny is a projection of dependence upon the father. If, according to theistic faith, God is the origin of destiny, then this is a transference of paternal dependency. Hence, destiny becomes a pattern of conduct revolving around the father and equivalent paternal figures. Freud argues, further, that childhood development is a series of introjections, including parents, teachers, and other authorities. A normal destiny depersonalizes the Oedipus complex, that is; we ought to mature by going beyond our parental introjections until we confront the final horizon of nature or death. Then Freud says the "last figure in the series that began with the parents is the dark power of Destiny which only the fewest of us are able to look upon as impersonal" (Freud 1961: 168). He refers to destiny with the Greek term *moira*, which means "lot" or "allotment," but he defines it parentally.

The "dark power of destiny" is apparently death. We cannot go beyond the Oedipus complex because of the threat that death poses. This insight connects death and destiny in a concrete way. Freud states: "In *The Ego and the Id* I made an attempt to derive mankind's realistic fear of death, too, from the same parental view of fate" (Freud 1961: 168). This means that the ego clings to the power of the father in the face of death. If the ego should feel unloved and unprotected, then one would suffer separation anxiety and succumb to death. When separated from the protection of the father, then *thanatos* takes over the organism in a repetitive-compulsive movement toward death.

This idea is actually a version of a theme Freud developed before the appearance of his dualistic drive theory. In his 1910 essay entitled "Leonardo Da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood" Freud refers to the laws of nature as forms of fate, as a necessity, or *ananke* in Greek (Freud 1957: 125). All events in human life are governed by chance occurrences of childhood and the necessities of nature. This natural necessity exerts a cruelty. Thus, the task of religion is to formulate illusions out of the infantile need to be protected from loneliness and the threat of death. Such illusions would be based upon a transference of the father's authority. This point illustrates further the fact that destiny is a defensive function.

Finally, Freud presents his ideas of death and destiny in his 1913 essay on “The Theme of the Three Caskets.” He cites the three goddesses of destiny in Greek mythology, and he believes they were created after the human discovery that humankind is “a part of nature and therefore subject to the immutable law of death” (Freud 1958: 299). The three figures also symbolize the identity of love and death. They correspond to the three women who love a man: the mother who gives birth to him; the wife who mates with him; and mother-earth who destroys him at death. Only mother-earth loves the man the most.

The phrase “immutable law of death,” cited above, acknowledges destiny as an inexorable force, while Freud’s other discussions refer to it as a defense against drive conflicts. This apparent discrepancy can be resolved by recognizing that the so-called “immutable law of death” has an Oedipal perspective. The descent to death is a return to the mother. It is governed by *thanatos*, because the tendency of each instinctual drive is to restore an earlier condition. Thus, destiny as an instinctually-driven pattern of conduct is cyclical.

Carl Jung’s Concept of Destiny

Although Carl Jung’s work evolved in opposition to Freud’s, Jung agreed with Freud’s thesis that the father is decisive in the destiny of the individual (Jung 1961: 303). Infancy conflicts between the child and the father take shape as adult neuroses. When a child is unconsciously attracted to the father, he or she may unknowingly act out of his influence. This may be creative or destructive. The unresolved inner conflict with the father is projected into one’s life as a fate. This projection becomes a life-long pattern of conduct, and it functions as an unconscious compensation for the lack of a resolution.

Jung also emphasized, however, that the image of the mother is integral to one’s destiny. The mother symbolizes the primordial womb of nature. Beginning with the mother-child bond, life arises from the mother at birth and returns to her at death. This is the meaning of human fate (Jung 1956: 355–357). Each individual is called to go forth from the mother in a process of individuation of self-realization. The failure to surpass the mother can bring on a neurosis. Paradoxically, however, the exercise of creativity, which is an important means of growth, requires that one affirm the fertile powers of the mother.

The meaning of neurosis is essentially the failure of individuation. The neurotic suffers a compulsion which functions as a fate. Unlike Freud, however, Jung does not describe fateful processes in causal terms. He believes that the modern category of statistical probability has

undercut the rule of causality. As an example, he uses the term synchronicity, which means a spontaneous coincidence of distant events which come together meaningfully in human experience (Jung 1960: 489). Whereas causality is based on necessity, synchronicity functions by simultaneity and meaning. Synchronistic phenomena are psychic and not mediated by space-time sensory data. A synchronicity is a fourth element alongside space, time, and causality (Jung 1960: 506).

The context of a synchronous event is derived from an archetype. This is a pre-determined, general imaginal form, co-existing with the drives in the collective unconscious and descending from primeval times. As pre-existing systems, archetypes erupt by contingency or psychic probability in the form of symbolism. Thus, people who fall in love, marry, procreate children, suffer, and die are actually governed by unconscious symbolic forms. For example, the male who desires to procreate children is acting unconsciously out of the father archetype, which has possessed men since the beginning of life.

According to Jung, the archetypes and drives are inherited through the collective unconscious or objective psyche. They precede individual life and give meaning and value to it. The father archetype, in particular, endows each male with the qualities of good and evil. The reason is that the father is the law-giver in the traditional family. Similarly, God is the ultimate manifestation of the father archetype. Thus, destiny as a pattern of behavior is informed by hereditary archetypal systems which are permanently inherent in nature.

Rollo May's Concept of Destiny

Rollo May's understanding of destiny has grown out of the position originally expounded by his teacher Paul Tillich. Both set freedom in a polar relation with destiny. Though freedom is difficult to define, it is nevertheless a primal reality. Basically, freedom is the capacity to act, to do, to affirm oneself (May 1981: 9). Freedom is essential to being human, but it cannot be separated from destiny. Without destiny freedom becomes arbitrariness. Without freedom destiny lacks significance.

While admitting the difficulty in comprehending freedom, May offers two perspectives (May 1981: 52–57). On the one hand, freedom is the ability to act and to choose among possibilities. This is existential freedom. On the other hand, freedom is an inward sense of being, a wholeness. This is essential freedom. Although the latter is mainly inner, it still influences events in the external world. Thus, existential freedom flows out of essential freedom.

The essence of freedom is not given. It has a tendency to change. Destiny is given. It functions as the limiting context in which freedom occurs. The structure of destiny forces us to struggle for freedom and to experience its primal value. This does not seem to fit the assumptions of American culture where destiny is subordinate to existential freedom. May believes that we Americans actually lack a sense of destiny, because we emphasize individualism and deemphasize community and social responsibility.

The term destiny is also difficult to define. It contains aspects of design and direction. Destiny should not be confused with determinism. The latter term comes from physics and refers to the predictable motion of objects in space. Although destiny may involve an element of determinism, it is a part of self-consciousness or freedom. May defines destiny as “the pattern of limits and talents that constitute the ‘givens’ in life” (May 1981: 89). Such limits may be large or small, but we are required to respond to them. “*Destiny* is a term that describes our condition *prior* to sociological and moral judgments. One’s destiny is archetypal and ontological; the term refers to one’s original experience at each moment. *It is the design of the universe speaking through the design of each one of us*” (May 1981: 89–90).

As a design, destiny is present on several levels. (1) Cosmic destiny includes inexorable events of nature like birth and death, earthquakes and volcanoes, pleasure and rapture in the outdoors. (2) Genetic destiny consists of our biological inheritance. (3) Cultural destiny entails family background and social tradition. (4) Circumstantial destiny incorporates crises, such as social catastrophes or accidents (May 1981: 90–91). While some of these levels might be deterministic, others involve personal factors. For example, an accident may not be a matter of chance but an outgrowth of a previous self-destructive life style. Such a self-destructive destiny could evolve from a cruel fixation upon the mother in infancy.

May’s crucial insight into the meaning of destiny appears to be that of limit. Limitations inherent in nature, community, illness, and death bring out a sense of destiny. Even though a destiny may be traumatic, nevertheless it forces us to struggle for creativity. This may include cooperation, awareness and acknowledgment, engagement, confrontation and challenge, encountering and rebelling from the destiny. These responses can enhance freedom.

Throughout his book May employs the term fate. He points out that in our ordinary usage destiny is conceived positively and fate negatively; but he cautions us not to separate these two meanings too widely. The so-called negative element in fate is integral to destiny. He even

criticizes Martin Buber for distinguishing between destiny as good and fate as bad (May 1981: 94–95). Such a distinction is moralistic and secondary. Fate and destiny actually represent a pre-moral ontological condition.

For May, the experience of fate must be included in that of destiny in order to experience its power. I take May's idea to mean the power of being which is inherent in freedom. If we wish to find an illustration of the correct understanding of fate or freedom, then we should look to Nazi Germany. "Hitler developed his great power over the German people by his use of destiny, demonic as this power was. When he spoke of the destiny of the German people, he was using the term correctly no matter how destructive his campaigns turned out to be" (May 1981: 95).

The moment in our experience when destiny appears most clearly is the awareness of death. May's emphasis is on knowing that we will die rather than on death itself. When we are aware of death as our final horizon, we are forced to speak the truth honestly. This includes accepting the anxiety that the necessity of dying triggers. The temptation is to deny death as a destiny and to project it onto others as an evil. This projection introduces a moralistic distinction between insiders as good and outsiders as bad. To block death as a destiny from consciousness raises the possibility of tragedy. Without the vision of mortality our perspective on reality is lost.

The tendency toward denial is also a symptom of anxiety. Some of the current social trends, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, and hedonism, are attempts to escape anxiety. The reason appears to be a deep fear of despair, as though it would engulf us if we were to consent to our destiny. The acceptance of anxiety and despair can be constructive, however. It can enhance awareness in the same way that the consent to destiny increases freedom.

Leopold Szondi's Analysis of Destiny

The foregoing psychologists have offered important insights into the concept of destiny, but none of them has made it the central concern of his work. The principal contemporary thinker, for whom destiny is the basic concept, is Leopold Szondi. He has assembled, mainly in German, a large body of technical literature known as the "analysis of destiny" (*Schicksalsanalyse*). His work represents a systematic reorganization of psychiatry based upon psychoanalysis, medical genetics, and the transpersonal psychology of consciousness. He intended his position to be independent of and yet related to those discussed above.

Originally trained in Budapest as a biologically-oriented physician, Szondi began his medical career by investigating endocrinology and its relation to mental retardation. This led him, during

the 1920s, to research the family backgrounds of his patients. He began to realize that mental illness as well as life-style were influenced by heredity, the environment, and internal lesions suffered at birth. He learned that the family transmits both healthy and unhealthy patterns for several generations.

In 1937 he published an English-language essay in which he explained his family research and his emerging concept of destiny (Szondi 1937). He posed the following question: Why do we marry whom we marry? After examining many cases, he argues that marriage choice is frequently governed by unconscious genetic factors and is not by chance. For example, the bearers of the same illness tend to be attracted to one another. This includes the major psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia, epilepsy, and depression. Such attraction may be observed in tight-knit, homogeneous communities where gene pools are loaded with lethal tendencies.

Szondi's psychiatric conclusions were based upon principles in classical Mendelian genetics. Gregor Mendel had distinguished between dominant and recessive modes of transmission. Szondi argued that recessive genes, though latent or subthreshold, operate as psychological influences within the organism. At the moment of conception, when the latent recessive genes are excluded from the phenotype, a disequilibrium is created. The developing organism goes on to seek partners, who bear the same recessives in order to create an equilibrium and achieve genetic symmetry.

Latent recessive genes shape the basic needs and tendencies of the person. For example, a combination of normal and abnormal genes that code for schizophrenia does not produce that illness, but it does promote schizoid characteristics like narcissism, aloofness, and a capacity for abstract thinking. Similarly, a mixture of normal and epileptic genes conditions the person to be irritable, frequently angry, and vulnerable to fits of rage and migraine headaches. These persons are carriers who are heterozygous for the respective traits.

With this research background Szondi formulated his theory of destiny. He posited the familial unconscious (*Das familiäre Unbewusste*), as the dimension of the latent recessive genes (Szondi 1987: 16). This corresponds to what has been called the genetic load, but more precisely it represents the idea of familiarity, which means the sharing of the genes across the generations of the family. Recessive genes are transmitted for several generations, and they are mainly lethal. Everyone is born into the world with a cluster of latent recessive genes that pose existential possibilities.

The familial unconscious influences personal choices. These are not trivial decisions, but rather they are ways of coping with the major situations of human life. The specific situations are marriage, friendship, vocation, illness, and mode of death. It is likely that as we deal with these situations our personal decisions will grow out of our family background. Flowing through the family, from generation to generation, are ancestral models which erupt as existential possibilities. When considering both the choices and inherited possibilities, we can understand what Szondi means by destiny. Destiny is the “totality of all inherited and freely chosen existence possibilities” (Szondi 1968: 21). Destiny is a dynamic-functional, dialectical co-existence of the ancestral compulsions and the freedom of the choosing ego (Szondi 1954: 18). Destiny is neither totally determined nor totally free.

The familial unconscious operates according to two laws. One is the law of quantitative variability (Szondi 1987: 59). Among family members who share the same genes for epilepsy, one will inherit more genes and become an epileptic, while another member will inherit fewer genes and suffer fits of rage. Both members share the same genes in a variable quantitative proportion; but the epileptic would be homozygous for the trait, and they who suffer fits of rage would be heterozygous.

The other law is that of polarity. Families that transmit genes for specific disorders also transmit genes that code for defenses against those disorders (Szondi 1992: 23). Defenses may take shape as forms of sublimation which, for Szondi, means choosing a socially acceptable outlet for the hereditary disposition, typically through a vocation. Families with epilepsy will include helping professions, such as medicine, clinical psychology, social work, or the ministry. Thus, every family embodies both symptoms and sublimation in some form and intensity. Carriers of genes for schizophrenia are inclined toward psychiatry, detective work, or vocations requiring abstract thinking. Since the genes for schizophrenia are deleterious and schizophrenics tend not to marry, their vocational choices function genetically as a balancing selection.

The task of each family member is to choose a free destiny. Making truly free choices is possible but rarely done. Many of us cannot choose our destinies freely, but we are conditioned by hereditary, learned, or traumatic factors. This poses a theoretical distinction between two kinds of destinies. The one that is free is called *ergotropic*, but the compulsive one is called *genotropic*. This distinction fits the English language difference between destiny and fate. Although Szondi contends that there are two kinds of destiny, he uses the German term *Schicksal*

to account for both: *Freiheits-Schicksal* and *Zwangs-Schicksal*, that is, a free destiny and a compulsive fate.

To claim that a destiny is free or fateful is to raise the question of a criterion? How do we identify or confirm these patterns? The fateful, compulsive patterns of choice may be found in neuroses and psychoses, but the so-called free choices are not entirely exempt from hereditary tendencies toward illness. Choices of a free destiny are relative or variable. Destiny begins with the first choice; and with the last choice, in which one suffers and dies, destiny comes to an end (Szondi 1954: 15).

The answers to these questions lead to Szondi's theory of instinctual drives. Szondi agreed with Freud that human conduct is grounded in drives. These are partly biological, partly psychological forms of behavior. Drives are ahistorical, powerful, and non-linear with non-specific content (Szondi 1960: 25–26). Though inherited from archaic nature, they can be modified by learning and culture. Human drives should not be confused with animal instincts. The latter are strictly programmed, rigidly followed, and not modifiable. Both drives and instincts are conservative, as they strive to repeat earlier conditions. Although Freud would agree with this description of a drive, he does not seem to explain why they are conservative. The answer, supplied by Szondi, is that drives are conservative because genes are (Szondi 1968: 62). Genes tend to repeat earlier conditions, and drives come from genes (Szondi 1960: 29–30).

In contrast to Freud's dualistic system Szondi's is four-fold. They are the (1) sexual, (2) paroxysmal, (3) contact drives and (4) and the ego. The sexual, paroxysmal, and contact drives are shared with animals and, therefore, constitute the animal brain. The ego is uniquely human, and it is the seat of decisions for destiny. Szondi also differs from Freud by describing the structure of each drive differently. In Freud's view *eros* and *thanatos* are set in an either/or relation. Szondi believes that each drive is a composite synthesis of subordinate needs and polar tendencies. The drive is a system derived from the needs, exhibiting a both/and structure and consisting of at least four genes.

For Szondi the sexual drive comprises the two needs of love and aggression. Each need has, in turn, a polarity of positive and negative tendencies. Szondi's conceptual model is as follows:

The Sexual Drive (S)

The Need for Love (h)

Individual Love (h+)

The Need for Aggression (s)

Active Aggression (s+)

Altruism (h-)

Passive Aggression (s-)

Szondi's view of love conforms to what the ancient Greeks understood as *eros*. The aggression need has been confirmed in ethology and neurology as a component of sexuality. It replaces Freud's *thanatos*, for which no evidence exists. Altogether love and aggression coalesce in normal sexuality. When both needs are satisfied in sexual encounters, then ecstasy results.

Although they are often confused, sexuality should be distinguished from contact behavior. Szondi recognized the contact drive in animal experiments in Budapest in 1937, and since then the same idea has appeared in the literature of ethology after World War Two. Contact is the drive to make and maintain relationships. Ontologically, the contact drive is fundamental, because relatedness must underlie all instinctual drive behavior. The contact drive also conditions parental activities like caring for the young. Szondi's conceptual model is as follows:

The Contact Drive (C)

The Need for Acquisition (d)

The Need for Attachment (m)

Seeking (d+)

Bonding (m+)

Clinging (d-)

Separating (m-)

One of Szondi's most original contributions deals with the role of emotion. Much of his research explored epilepsy and hysteria, and out of that work he posited the paroxysmal drive. This is actually a drive-like startle pattern, according to which the organism releases affects in defense against inner and outer dangers. In Szondi's system the paroxysmal pattern comprises a synthesis of epileptoid and hysteroid needs and tendencies. Szondi's conceptual model is as follows:

The Paroxysmal Drive (P)

The Need for Restitution (e)

The Need for Self-Worth (hy)

The Abel Tendency (e+)

Self-Affirming (hy+)

The Cain Tendency (e-)

Self-Concealing (hy-)

The paroxysmal drive is discharged in response to threatening crises. We may cope with threats positively or negatively. A negative coping triggers the Cain tendency, which releases rage, hatred, anger, jealousy, envy, or vengeance. These are called the Cain emotions, and they are the psychiatric equivalent of the irascible in classical Christian theology. The eruption of the Cain intent normally activates the tendency toward self-concealment in the forms of shame, guilt, fear, or anxiety. These affects then rotate the organism toward a restitution, forgiveness, or

atonement. Out of the guilt, shame, or fear, the Abel tendency acts to satisfy the need for restitution. The Abel tendency comprises love, joy, courage, passion, and compassion. These are the Abel emotions, and they roughly correspond to the virtues of classical Christian theology. Love exemplifies *agape* in New Testament Greek. When the Abel emotions are worked through and restitution is achieved, one fulfills the need for self-worth. The capacity for restitution and the feeling of self-worth constitute normal moral experience.

The paroxysmal drive is the instinctual basis of all emotional behavior. The Cain and Abel polar tendencies are epileptoid, and the value-laden self-affirming/self concealing tendencies are hysteroid. The former react to inner threats, the latter to outer perils. Szondi has clearly recognized that epilepsy and hysteria are complementary. Both are means to cope with the shock of crises. The one striking difference is that the epileptic carries within him or her a pool of Cain emotions, and the hysteric feels the need for self-worth. More precisely, the epileptic has a wish to kill, the hysteric a wish to be loved.

While humans share the sexual, paroxysmal, and contact drives with animals, only humans inherit the disposition to shape an ego with which to make decisions and deal with ancestral influences. Szondi points out that the primal form of the ego is the striving for participation or relatedness in social and metaphysical reality (Szondi 1956: 35). Thus, the ego is a participatory agent which arises out of the body as a drive but cannot be precisely located in the body. The ego functions as an act or rhythmic process. Szondi's conceptual model is as follows:

The Ego (Sch)

The Need for Expansion (p)	The Need for Contraction (k)
Inflation (p+)	Introjection (k+)
Projection (p-)	Negation (k-)

The letters Sch refer to *Schicksal* and indicate the fact that the ego, through decision-making, shapes a destiny. The two needs represent a process of going beyond oneself in ecstatic states, exercising imagination, or feeling the power of being, on the one hand; and the act of limiting oneself, contracting, or adapting to ordinary social reality by the assertion of the will, on the other hand. Szondi's favorite analogy for the two needs is the rhythm of blood pressure, of systolic expansion and diastolic contraction. The ego is a flow pattern of alternating states of transcendence and adaptation.

Much of Szondi's clinical work deals with various kinds of destinies derived from instinctual drive conflicts. The technical term is *Entmischung* which comes from chemistry and means the breaking down of compound substances. Szondi elaborates in several large volumes how the drives, individually and collectively, break down into neurotic and pathological forms. For example, the sexual drive splits into inversion, perversion, and sadomasochism. The paroxysmal drive splinters into criminal activity, psychosomatic symptoms, and religious behavior. Contact splitting informs the mood disorders of depression, mania, and manic-depression. The ego splits into schiziform disorders of paranoia and catatonia.

Szondi's view of drive splitting is intended to be a clinical reconstruction of Freud's ideas of defusion and *thanatos*. While there may be no evidence of a death drive, there certainly is for personal disintegration. This insight provides a theoretical explanation for the role of fate. They who suffer compulsive patterns of behavior are controlled by various drive conflicts. Since these are shared with animal nature, a fate pattern is regressive. It is also disharmonious, because all of the instinctual drives are conditioned to flow harmoniously. The widespread prevalence of splitting, as with acts of aggression split off from tender love, for example, leads Szondi to believe that all destinies are inevitably tragic. Ironically, however, suffering a tragedy affirms our greatness as unique creatures; for we stand out from nature as self-conscious, reflective beings.

The instinctual drive behavior most closely connected to a theological view of destiny is the paroxysmal. The main concept is that of the Cain complex, taken from Genesis chapter four, and it is defined as the son who hates the brother and loves the father. The terms may be applied to hostility between sisters in order to secure the attention of the father. Collectively and historically, the Cain complex accounts for politics as fratricide or the striving against the "brother" on behalf of God or in pursuit of immortality.

The Cain complex usually erupts in the family between ages three and five. It will then become dormant in subsequent years of childhood until reemerging in adolescence, middle age, and old age. Generally, the Cain predicament comes on the eve of puberty and in the face of death. When the Cain tendency erupts, it generates the polar tensions of hostility (e-) and anxiety (hy-). During later adulthood, in particular, epileptoid hostility and hysteroid anxiety appear in times of crisis. Since these factors are polar and rotating, an outburst of the Cain

deepens the anxiety; or anxiety in the face of death triggers the Cain as a defense, and this may take shape as migraines, fits of rage, hypertension, or angina pectoris.

Szondi knew that the principal biblical figures were afflicted by the Cain complex or Cain tendency. In his life Moses was homicidal (Ex. 2:12), visionary (Ex. 3:6), and a stutterer (Ex. 4:10). These would be paroxysmal-epileptoid symptoms (Szondi 1973: 107). Nevertheless, he became the agent of the revelation of the Law on Mount Sinai (Ex. 19:16–19). The New Testament gospel writers portrayed Jesus as displaying intense rage (Mk. 3:5) and anxiety in the face of death (Mk. 14: 34–35). Paul revealed a Cain complex when he admitted persecuting his Gentile brethren in order to advance in the patriarchal Jewish tradition (Gal. 1:13–14; Phil. 3:5–6; 1 Cor. 15:9). (Hughes 1982: 14) Paul went on to become an apostle to the Gentiles and to expand the Christian mission.

Since the main biblical figures function as archetypal models, their biographies attest to a psychological fact of destiny. This fact, whether historical or legendary, illustrates Szondi's argument that paroxysmal-epileptoid persons are accident prone (Szondi 1969: 123; Hedri 1963: 66). Living out of intense emotion makes us vulnerable medically and existentially. This may occur as rage blocks arterial blood flow or provokes our death through someone's retaliation.

As an existential formula, the Cain complex bears upon issues of freedom and destiny. As Szondi once said in a letter to me, only they who resolve the Cain complex are truly free and masters of their destinies (Szondi 1979). They who cannot work through the Cain predicament to a restitution are compelled to live a fateful life with obsessive-compulsive aspects. Such a fate means living with primitive emotions without atonement or wholeness. An unresolved Cain complex provokes a tragic fate, but a fully resolved Cain complex leads to restitution and freedom.

An Assessment of These Theories

Having surveyed the major psychological theories of destiny, I turn to a critical evaluation of them.

Freud. Psychoanalytically, a destiny is determined by the conflict between defenses and the drives. Unless resolved, this tension converts into neurotic symptoms. It is well-known that such disturbances come from early childhood, and this is widely accepted.

The most controversial aspect of Freud's theory is his reliance upon a dualistic drive theory. The implied criticism is that the dualism is too simple in causation and too speculative in intent.

When disciples come to Freud's defense, they invariably reconstruct his position existentially. For example, Robert Fliess comments: "Why then, one is forced to ask, is the dualistic theory [of the instincts controversial]?" I believe in the last analysis because the theoretician is human. Prone as is everyone to fear death, and incapable as are we all, of imagining his own, he avoids the fear, again as do we all, through a denial whose perhaps subtlest form is while knowing one *will* die, to ignore that one *must*" (Fliess 1982: 211). The irony of such an explanation is that the instinctual drive basis is replaced by an existential view of death. This points toward Tillich's contention that having to die is the fundamental issue.

Jung. The concept of the archetype was intended to advance beyond Freud's alleged reductionism. The difficulty with Jung's approach is that it has confused two levels of discourse: the ethical and the biological. This confusion occurs particularly in Jung's discussion of the father archetype. When he says that men inherit the inclination to become fathers, then he is speaking biologically; but when he ascribes the moral value of good and evil to fatherhood, then he slips into an ethical dimension. Nature does not define moral values. Nature only bequeaths a tendency to act in ways that people might interpret as moral. Archetypes are more accurately understood as cross-cultural, psychoid forms dwelling in the collective unconscious.

Jung has made, however, a far-reaching contribution with his idea of synchronicity. He has removed the problem of destiny from a simple cause-effect model, as in Freud's doctrine. Jung's approach is historically opportune in light of the drift toward relational models in the sciences. Currently, fundamental analyses of reality are being made successfully in relational terms. This would imply that relating is the most general property of being. Therefore, destiny is also a mode of relating within the cosmos.

May. One of the central issues in this essay is whether there are two kinds of destiny. May rejects any distinction between the two and contends that fate and destiny are integral ontologically. He argues that assertions about destiny are pre-moral and pre-sociological.

In contrast, I believe that fate and destiny—though related—actually refer to two different conditions. They represent a continuum of free and unfree choices. Such a distinction would seem to be useful professionally. The therapist or pastor who sees a client, usually in a situation of compulsion or splitting, wants to help him or her achieve control, wholeness, and a new direction in his or her life. Theologically, the difference between fate and destiny is useful for the doctrine of estrangement. We may suffer the fate of instinctual splitting as we live our daily

lives, but our goal is to achieve an essential wholeness and make free decisions. Certainly, wholeness may be rare, but it is an ideal which breaks into estranged existence. Thus, May's distinction between existential and essential freedom is a good one, and it corresponds to that between fate and destiny.

One difficulty with May's theory is that when he identifies the different kinds of destiny, he does not explain them sufficiently. He reveals acute insights into the various dimensions of destiny, but he lacks a comprehensive theory to correlate the cosmic, genetic, cultural, and circumstantial levels. His attempted explanation actually lapses into a psychoanalytic viewpoint.

Szondi. Anyone who reads Szondi's large volumes will discover an erudite, breath-taking system with great visionary power, and filled with original insights, extensive clinical experience, and scientific rigor. While his work has been highly respected, particularly in Europe, it has been subject to criticism and misunderstanding. For example, the priority he assigns to the concept of destiny has encouraged some critics to dismiss his system as another version of Calvinist predestinarian thinking. This kind of comparison is unfounded, because Szondi neither defines destiny in terms of causality nor proposes absolute freedom. Predestination means that God, in his absolute sovereignty and freedom, selects his own people to salvation by means of hidden, remote causes (Calvin 1997: 72, 101). In contrast, Szondi's understanding of destiny is like the pattern of behavior in biology and the behavioral sciences. Szondi ascribes absolute freedom to the unconscious, and he maintains that freedom becomes relative in the exercise of decision-making.

The most controversial aspect of Szondi's work is his genetic theory. There is no disputing the fact that heredity combines with learned and traumatic behavior to shape human personality. What is questioned in Szondi's system is his appeal to latent recessive genes as the source of human needs and tendencies. The charge is that recessivity cannot be easily validated, because the genetic traits must be inferred from the phenotype.

Another criticism is that his drive theory is speculative. For example, the paroxysmal drive, which is central to religious experience, is a composite of epileptoid and hysteroid needs and tendencies. It is characterized by sudden explosiveness and instability. The problem is whether the affective phenomena conform exactly to his conceptual model of $e^{+,-}$ and $hy^{+,-}$. It seems that Szondi has drawn upon the dialectical model of the German idealistic tradition to account for the empirical data. This raises the question as to whether the dialectic is actually necessary.

I believe that Szondi is essentially a relational thinker. The evidence may be found in his claim that the contact drive is fundamental and that the ego obeys the law of participation (Szondi 1963: 480; Szondi 1956: 35–36). It is also implied in his rejection of causality, linear time, and metrical space as parameters of the ego (Szondi 1956: 414). My contention is, however, that dialectical is not the same as relational. The former revolves around the subject-object, polar cognitive model; but the latter assigns priority to relatedness and makes subject-object connections and polarity derivative. This distinction fits the difference between fate and destiny. Fate is conduct driven by subject-object forces, but destiny is harmonious, integrated behavior within the relational continuum of the universe.

Toward a Theory of Destiny

When Paul Tillich developed the idea of destiny, he conceived of it as a limiting yet meaningful context of freedom. The consequence of his view is that destiny is understood as integral to the self rather than as the result of external forces. This understanding provides an alternative to the predestinarian theology in the Augustinian-Calvinist tradition. Consequently, destiny cannot be reduced to the category of causality or derived from absolute freedom. Predestinarian thought ascribes remote causes to God and proximate causes to the human world and makes them symmetrical (Calvin 1997: 101).

Destiny is indeed bound to freedom, but freedom is finite. As Rollo May emphasizes, freedom is both existential and essential. Existential freedom is exercised in personal choices. Szondi's scheme of the five choices pertains to existential freedom. Marriage, friendship, vocation, illness, and mode of death are crucial decisions that exhibit a destiny existentially. Essential freedom is a sense of wholeness that is experienced in the highest unity of the self beyond space, time, and causality.

The theory of destiny is not identifiable with chance. The reason is that the dispositions for existential choices come out of one's personal background. Tillich's sense of what the precedents are can be illumined by two theories of the unconscious which Szondi has synthesized. The collective unconscious is central to Jung's psychology and the familial to Szondi's. Whereas the former is inferred from the eruption of archetypes into symbolic forms, the latter is expressed through existential choices, such as marriage, that do not occur by chance. Szondi has criticized Jung for failing to ground the collective unconscious in biological reality

(Szondi 1977: 25). Szondi's concern is that without a biological basis, as with the instinctual drives, then a precise diagnosis of pathology cannot be made.

The reality of the unconscious indicates a primal origin of the personality. What unfolds in the life of the person is already contained germinally in the beginning. A cluster of existential possibilities is given to us from the beginning. The possibilities are healthy or unhealthy, constructive or destructive. Although given, they must be chosen and acted out in experience in fateful patterns. The possibilities can be modified through learning and traumas.

Since destiny is a part of finite freedom, it is also capable of self-contradiction. We are free to give up our freedom. The fact of self-contradiction requires the distinction between fate and destiny. Self-contradictions are manifest in various neurotic and psychotic pathologies. Each of the foregoing theories can account for the pathologies, but Szondi's is the most comprehensive. He knows that the increase of fate correlates with the decrease of the power of freedom. A compulsive choice has only the superficial appearance of freedom. Thus, the concept of destiny embraces a wide range of free or fated possibilities. Destiny is not a matter of a simple process explainable in linear terms. Destiny combines both choice and the fate aspect, but fate excludes any sense of free choice.

The self-contradiction of freedom can be explained by the splitting or disintegration of the instinctual drives. Under the condition of disintegration one falls to pieces, comes apart at the seams, as it were, and one lacks wholeness or centeredness. As an example, a man may be healthy and feel well; but if he cannot sustain a marriage or keep a job, he is fatefully disturbed in the order of destiny. Decision-making is the key to mental health; feeling well or lacking symptoms is not. The order of destiny constitutes a continuum of decision-making, some of which are relatively free, but some are not. This order of fateful decisions can become destructive and potentially pose the risk of death.

The existence of instinctual drives is conceded by the above theorists, though reluctantly by May. All agree on sexuality and the ego. Szondi's version of the contact drive is implied in Jung's view of the mother-child bond. Both sexuality and contact fit the pleasure principle in psychoanalysis. Freud and Szondi know that the pleasure principle leads to self-destruction. All acknowledge the impact of threats, except that Szondi's paroxysmal drive is a broader and more original concept compared to those of the other psychologists. May concedes that anxiety is a product of the startle pattern and that it is shared by humans and animals (May 1977: 55).

Unlike Szondi, however, May makes affects secondary to the startle and denies the integral wholeness of human paroxysmality.

Szondi's four-fold drive theory is useful for theology. It shows the kinds of conflicts present in estranged existence. As Tillich has argued, post-fallen existence is controlled by alienation. The manifold forms of drive splitting can illustrate this condition. Drive splitting also illumines the interplay between fate and finite freedom. In a previous work I have pointed out that the episodes in Genesis chapters three and four, or the stories of Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel respectively, are primarily shock events that trigger the paroxysmal drive (Hughes 1992: 109–116, 132–140). The outcome of surcharged paroxysmality is accident proneness or premature death.

If Szondi's drive theory were accepted by theology, it would have to signify ultimate values. Such signification would occur through sublimation. One merit of Szondi's work is that sexuality is not the only drive transferrable to an ultimate level. Other drives may be sublimated as well. For example, the contact drive, when transferred to an ultimate dimension, informs the doctrine of providence. In Tillich's view providence is a directing presence of God in the world, and it represents a kind of "divine destiny" (Tillich 1951: 248–249). While there is no exact causal influence, we can trust that God cares for us.

The paroxysmal drive is also subject to sublimation. The classical theological portrayal of divine wrath and grace (Ex. 34:6) is a transference of the Cain and Abel tendencies, respectively, to God. Similarly, the prominence of paroxysmality among the Hebrew prophets indicates that this drive is active in biblical experience. By analogy, therefore, the theologian who wrestles with the problem of human destiny works within the paroxysmal circle.

Finally, the pattern of destiny culminates in death. Szondi argues that death is not the only meaning of destiny; but rather destiny is a part of the process of becoming human (Szondi 1963a: 117). Nevertheless, destiny ends in death. As the final horizon, death can stimulate psychosomatic symptoms, personal disintegration, and various fate patterns of self-destruction. Whether near or remote, death activates the paroxysmal drive. This may occur with guilt and anxiety, anger and courage. Since for Tillich freedom affirms itself in spite of fate, it does so with courage. Freedom takes over the courage to be into one's destiny. Courage is an Abel emotion, and therefore courage helps to atone for the Cain tendency triggered by the threats of nonbeing.

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